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INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND WORLD HEALTH POLICY: HELPING PEOPLE REACH THEIR FULL POTENTIAL（3） |
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND WORLD HEALTH POLICY: HELPING PEOPLE REACH THEIR FULL POTENTIAL（3）
B. A Missed Opportunity - WTO's Failure to Address Labor Standards
While provisions have been implemented to combat the subsidization of domestic industries by member States, [FN190] the WTO has failed to address subsidized wages and labor standards, even though those issues comprise the same areas of subsidization. [FN191] The WTO has stated that labor issues have no role in WTO negotiations and that labor issues are an area the *262 WTO should not address. [FN192] Agreements negotiated within the WTO do not cover "core labor standards." [FN193] By "core labor standards" the WTO is referring to everything from child labor laws, to forced labor, to the right to establish trade unions. [FN194] Rather, the WTO has conveniently deferred all labor issues to the International Labour Organization (ILO). [FN195] However, GATT Article XX [FN196] provides a host of exceptions for member States to deviate from their WTO obligations in order to pursue their own public policies, including what can be interpreted as labor concerns. [FN197] These exceptions highlight some inconsistencies within the WTO. Despite the WTO's insistence that it does not recognize human rights, WTO provisions seem to be drafted in a manner that concedes the fact that human rights cannot be ignored. [FN198]
The incorporation of labor standards into trade agreements is highly controversial. [FN199] For example, a corporation will invest in a State by opening a facility only if the workforce in that State is capable of producing that company's product [FN200] and the State has a sustainable infrastructure to support its business investment. [FN201] If a country does not have these elements in place, a business will be reluctant to invest in that country. [FN202] As such, despite their controversial nature, labor standards must be adopted by a country to alleviate fears a company may have when entering that market. To help member States make such adoption, the WTO should recognize labor standards as a *263 crucial element of their international trade system. [FN203] It would follow then, that member States be required to ensure they have a workforce that can produce, an infrastructure that can support both business and social activity, and policies in place to ensure sustainable economic growth. [FN204] It is here that basic human rights play an important role. They better ensure that a State can meet the above requirements and provide a foundation by which the WTO is helping both developed and developing member States protect the health of production and consumption. [FN205]
The WTO faces a dilemma regarding the incorporation of labor standards into WTO provisions; many WTO member States argue that labor standards have no role in provisions created by the WTO. [FN206] Many WTO member States believe that labor standards are not created to protect the health of a society, but rather to act as protectionist measures against other member States. [FN207] Protectionist measures are actions taken by governments, such as the funding of subsidies, to protect their domestic industries from foreign competition. [FN208] WTO member State representatives, who represent their country in WTO proceedings, believe that labor standards enacted by developed countries undermine the advantage of lower wages that some countries rely upon to compete internationally. [FN209] This adds to the controversial nature of labor standards being incorporated into the WTO and highlights one of the many dilemmas the WTO faces in taking such action in this area.
Curiously, while the WTO takes the position that labor issues have no role within the WTO, [FN210] its member States agreed to recognize "core labour standards" during the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference. [FN211] Despite this agreement, there are no *264 WTO committees, groups, or bodies currently working on this issue of "core labour standards," even though WTO member States recognized it as an important issue that needs to be addressed. [FN212] This is a curious contradiction within the WTO itself as the WTO has set forth that everything it does is a result of negotiation. [FN213] Negotiations have occurred regarding labor standards, and it was agreed that labor standards should be addressed. According to WTO policy, such a negotiated agreement should be reflected within WTO action, yet this is not what has occurred. Although the WTO has stated that it takes action based on agreements reached in negotiations, no WTO action has been taken here. It appears that, based on the WTO's own reasoning, action should be taken, though. [FN214] Here, the WTO has negotiated and recognized "core labour standards," [FN215] but has done nothing to further this position within the organization itself. [FN216]
The WTO has long held that it is not a human rights organization. [FN217] Human rights advocates have criticized the WTO for its arms length approach to human rights. [FN218] Trying to get the WTO to enforce human rights would mean the WTO would have to use trade measures as a means to enforce human rights. [FN219] The problem is not that the WTO refrains from holding itself out as an international body that monitors and enforces human rights, but rather, the fact that the fundamental aim of the WTO is to promote trade and economics. [FN220] Thus, it is argued that international human rights agencies should monitor the effects of globalization on human rights, not the WTO. [FN221] Nonetheless, *265 the WTO should not completely ignore a responsibility to recognize and promote human rights. [FN222]
While it should not be the role of the WTO to interpret human rights law, [FN223] the WTO should neither act as a barrier to the enforcement of human rights agreements, nor act as a haven for countries to ignore their human rights obligations. [FN224] The WTO has stated that it is an organization not just about liberalizing trade. [FN225] This is evidenced by the fact the WTO has, at times, supported some trade barriers that have protected consumers from the spread of disease. [FN226] This leads us to believe that the WTO knows that international trade affects people's lives, and that the WTO plays a role in improving the quality of life. Yet, the WTO still fails to fully acknowledge the connection between international trade and human rights. [FN227]
In this vein, WTO policy is, in itself, contradictory. [FN228] The WTO contends that it is not a human rights organization, but will allow trade sanctions if they protect consumers and help prevent the spread of disease. [FN229] It will not, however, allow for any trade sanctions against any member State that is in gross violation of an international human rights agreement. [FN230] Thus, since protecting the consumer and the population is not deemed a human rights concern by the WTO, it is an area the WTO is willing to monitor. [FN231] However, monitoring whether a member State is adhering to its international agreement to not legally allow a six-year-old child to work 12-hour days is deemed a *266 human rights issue by the WTO; [FN232] it is something the WTO will not address. [FN233] The distinction between protecting a population from the spread of disease and protecting against child labor abuses is difficult to comprehend, and the WTO is contradicting itself by addressing one area and not the other. [FN234]
Many international human rights organizations already exist that are designed to specifically monitor human rights issues. [FN235] The International Labour Organization (ILO), for example, focuses on labor issues. [FN236] Yet, even though the ILO focuses on labor issues, it has been able to successfully shift itself to a more human rights-based approach with regard to monitoring labor standards. [FN237] The ILO has made its interpretations and provisions congruent with international human rights standards. [FN238] The criticism levied against the WTO for not creating provisions that would establish labor standards for its member States [FN239] is largely based on the fact that human rights, including labor standards and international trade, are all significantly intertwined. [FN240] In addition, while the WTO has stated all labor issues are to be referred to the ILO, the WTO and ILO have not been able to reach an agreement where the two work together to address such issues. [FN241]
Competing labor standards would create additional problems and additional work for the ILO, the WTO, and their member States due to the fact that all parties involved would have to interpret each standard and find ways to apply each competing standard without violating the other. [FN242] The worst outcome would be that member States would be forced to implement *267 and adhere to both sets of standards (those from the ILO and those from the WTO) and face sanctions from both if they were to have any violations. [FN243] This would be extremely burdensome on both member countries and the organizations. The countries that already have problems understanding and adhering to their international obligations, are the same countries that are facing extreme economic and social difficulties. [FN244] The existence of competing standards would be especially hard on poor countries, which already struggle to meet the demands of their international requirements. Competing standards would also be overly burdensome on States, and would defeat the purpose of the WTO, which is to promote international trade, not place burdens on its member States. [FN245]
C. WTO's Progress in Recognizing Human Rights
While the WTO has been heavily criticized for its seemingly anti-human rights position, the organization has nonetheless implemented a few safety standards. [FN246] For example, GATT Article XX provides that member States can enact trade restriction measures against other member States, so long as they are not discriminatory or protectionist measures in order to protect human health, animal health, and plant life. [FN247] Additionally, the WTO has created provisions that deal specifically with food safety, animal health, animal safety, plant health, plant safety, and standard of care for products. [FN248] These are concrete examples of the WTO creating provisions that specifically aim to protect humanity, but more importantly indicate that human rights provisions are not outside of the WTO's reach. [FN249]
As mentioned, the safety provisions implemented by the WTO aim to address the safety of food for consumption and to create measures that address animal health and plant *268 safety. [FN250] The WTO claims these provisions must be based on science, are only to be applied to protect people, animals, and plant life, and are not to be applied arbitrarily or in a manner that discriminates against other member States. [FN251] When implementing such provisions, member countries are encouraged to use international standards, guidelines, and recommendations in the areas where they exist. [FN252] Curiously, while animal and plant safety measures have been implemented by the WTO and deemed important, [FN253] child labor safety measures have not. [FN254]
The WTO has also developed provisions to combat the dumping of goods on foreign markets. These provisions play a role in a member State's ability to protect the human rights of its citizens. [FN255] "Dumping" is defined as the selling of a product on a foreign market at an unfairly low price. [FN256] Article VI of GATT specifically permits member States to defend themselves against "dumping." [FN257] Other WTO agreements allow a member State to combat against "dumping" when there is material harm to a competing domestic industry. [FN258] The "dumping" of a good on a domestic market causes the price of that good to drop dramatically, making it difficult for domestic producers to profit from production of their goods. As such, dumping is extremely harmful to developing economies. [FN259] Consequently, domestic ability to produce such a good is stymied or not developed at all. [FN260] Without economic development, a country will struggle to implement policies that meet the social needs of its people. [FN261] This leads to an increase in poverty and human rights violations *269 which, in turn, make it more difficult for that country to develop socially and economically. [FN262]
Trade measures can be an appropriate instrument to use when addressing human rights issues. [FN263] The recognition of the social aspect of trade agreements is important and has been addressed from the creation of various international organizations and agreements. [FN264] For example, both the ILO and original GATT provisions recognize the need to promote human rights. [FN265] While international human rights law and international trade have been pursuing the same goal, which is improving the quality of human life, they seem to have been developing as separate entities. [FN266] The WTO, as the main organization on developing and promoting international trade, plays a major role in bringing these two branches of law together as separate but interdependent branches of international development. [FN267]
D. The WTO'S Secret Weapon: Trade Sanctions
The GATT was developed soon after the establishment of the U.N. to help promote trade. [FN268] Just as the U.N. does not allow the use of force upon a State when it violates a human rights agreement, the GATT/WTO does not allow for a State to impose trade sanctions on another State when human rights are violated. [FN269] The U.N. Charter does not allow for the use of force except for self-defense. [FN270] The use of force is also not permitted for the enforcement of treaties. [FN271] If an international law is violated, a respondent State or the U.N. cannot use force to make that State comply with their international agreement. [FN272] However, the U.N. allows trade sanctions to be implemented. *270 [ FN273] Thus, by allowing for the use of trade sanctions against a member State for human rights violations, the WTO would be in line with established international law. [FN274]
WTO member States are largely protected against trade sanctions based on human rights violations, because human rights are not part of the WTO trading system. [FN275] This illustrates that the WTO deems international trade more important than human rights. [FN276] Though trade sanctions may not be used against States who commit human rights violations, States are allowed to take measures, such as denial of visas to people coming from States known for human rights violations and denial of airplane landing rights to such countries. [FN277] To deny landing rights to airplanes from countries known for their human rights violations hardly seems like a measure that ensures a country will adhere to its human rights obligations. The most effective sanctions seem to be those where billions of dollars are at stake. [FN278]
If a WTO member State were allowed to place a sanction on another WTO member State, such a step would seem to be a protectionist move, because the sanctioned member State may feel that the State creating the sanction is simply trying to protect one of its domestic markets from foreign competition. [FN279] Human rights should not be a basis for an Article XX exception. [FN280] However, the current structure of the WTO still has room for a link between human rights and global trade within the current WTO framework. [FN281] Some contend that if the WTO were to incorporate human rights into its system, its credibility and dispute settlement system would be undermined. [FN282] This argument is not completely grounded, though, as the WTO currently faces a question concerning its credibility. The WTO's *271 dispute settlement system especially, has already been questioned and undermined. [FN283]
One of the WTO's main goals is to liberalize trade. [FN284] The WTO provides governments with a forum to conduct trade negotiations and create trade agreements. [FN285] Everything accomplished within the WTO is based on negotiations. [FN286] The WTO's "overriding purpose is to help trade flow as freely as possible - so long as there are no undesirable side-effects." [FN287] This seems to create additional dilemmas in regard to human rights. [FN288] Allowing a member State to explicitly ignore human rights agreements that a State voluntarily pledged to adhere to is an undesirable side effect that the WTO must avoid. [FN289]
E. The WTO's Other Secret Weapon: Dispute Settlement System
The WTO Dispute Settlement System has been in existence since January 1, 1995 and was established by an agreement entitled the "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes" (DSU). [FN290] The DSU has evolved over the years from a concept of dispute resolution at the outset of the GATT, to a three to five member panel between the 1950s and the mid-1990s, and to the final establishment of the DSU during the Uruguay Rounds in 1995. [FN291] The DSU provides an effective, multilateral solution for the determination of trade disputes, which prevents a single member State from declaring that a trade violation has occurred or from taking unilateral action to remedy the alleged trade violation. [FN292]
When at all possible, the WTO/DSU encourages the use of alternate procedures, such as negotiation in lieu of litigation, before the dispute settlement body. [FN293] This enables member *272 States to actively communicate about trade-related problems and allows the parties involved to reach a mutually beneficial resolution. [FN294] In fact, the DSU provides four possible methods for the settlement of disputes. [FN295] First, parties may engage in consultations or negotiations, as previously mentioned. [FN296] Second, parties may seek resolution through the adjudication by panels and the DSU Appellate Body. [FN297] Third, arbitration may be utilized by member States if parties to a dispute have an existing agreement to arbitrate and agree to resolve their dispute through such alternate means. [FN298] Fourth, parties to a dispute may agree to use mediation as a method to settle their dispute. [FN299]
Likewise, there are four major steps to the dispute settlement process. [FN300] First, consultations or "at least an attempt by the complainant to involve the respondent in consultations" must occur. These procedures are favored because they aid in the peaceful and amicable resolution of disputes. [FN301] If consultations are unsuccessful, the dispute is referred for adjudication by a panel. [FN302] The panel decision is appealable through appellate review proceedings. [FN303] Finally, the panel's decision during either the adjudication stage or appellate review stage must be implemented and enforced by the WTO. [FN304]
The WTO's DSU is an extremely effective international dispute resolution system [FN305] that can be both mimicked by other international bodies and utilized in alternate ways. Namely, the WTO system could be used as a means of effecting change in the human rights arena. If the WTO were to incorporate *273 human rights measures into its trading regime, then member States may be able to bring complaints that relate to international trade. [FN306] As such, violations of human rights obligations that affect the health of populations within nations may be adjudicated or resolved through the WTO settlement procedures. [FN307]
V. The WTO Must Require that its Members Adhere to the International Bill of
Human Rights and Enforce this Requirement through Trade Sanctions and its
Dispute Settlement System.
"Health is a fundamental human right indispensable for the exercise of other human rights." [FN308]
The WTO is the link between international trade and human rights. [FN309] Economics and its effect on the condition of human life cannot be ignored. [FN310] Based on its position of directly influencing economics and its ability to levy trade sanctions, the WTO should not ignore its role in helping member States improve the quality of life for their citizens. [FN311] The WTO can no longer ignore human rights. The WTO, along with its member States must promote human rights to ensure advancement of human rights and continued legitimacy of this multilateral trading system. [FN312] To fulfill this obligation, the WTO needs to evaluate its current position on human rights policies. [FN313] By implementing changes that reflect the reality that economics do affect human rights, the WTO improves its credibility as an international *274 organization. [FN314] In taking such steps, the WTO must require that its member States become parties to major international human rights treaties and enforce those obligations through either trade sanctions or its dispute settlement system.
It is apparent, then, that health issues matter because they directly affect human development. [FN315] Health-related inequalities restrict people from reaching their full potential. [FN316] The fundamental idea behind improving international trade relations between countries is to help better the lives of all people. [FN317] As the single most important international trade organization, the WTO plays a central role in furthering human life, especially within its member States. [FN318] The interactions between the WTO, developed countries, and developing countries directly affect the lives of people. [FN319] By incorporating and enforcing human rights standards, the WTO is acknowledging its own fundamental principle that free trade is about improving the quality of life for all people. [FN320]
Combating poverty is essential if a country is to provide a productive workforce capable of producing a quality good, at a fair price, for a sustainable period of time. [FN321] Without a "healthy" workforce, a country has no opportunity to develop economically. [FN322] Flowing from this is the necessity for a country to create an infrastructure that allows for social and economic activity. [FN323] If roads, water, food, electricity, and facilities are not available, a country cannot develop economically. [FN324] Without these in place, neither a company nor a State will be able to utilize the available workforce, thus inhibiting the ability to *275 produce goods for international markets. [FN325] It is essential that a country build an infrastructure upon which companies and people can rely on to conduct business and benefit from. A developed infrastructure is an important step to economic development. [FN326] The codification of basic human rights plays a role in creating such an infrastructure because human rights help ensure that a society can be productive. [FN327]
In addition, with the increased availability of international support, the responsibility to eradicate poverty and disease should not be placed entirely on a government. [FN328] A governmental entity simply may not have the resources to stop such widespread problems. [FN329] However, the government bears responsibility for providing the means to its citizens so that they may be able to free themselves from poverty and disease. [FN330] This responsibility necessarily invokes the need for implementation of basic human rights such as the right to education, right to health, right to food, and right to water. Each of these rights are related to poverty and disease. [FN331] The fulfillment of these rights will help to eradicate poverty and disease. [FN332] By doing so, a country gives itself the opportunity to grow economically and trade within the international community. [FN333] By requiring that a State implement some basic human rights into its domestic policies, the WTO is helping to ensure a State's workforce is productive and that the State can develop economically. [FN334] The WTO plays a role in helping a government fix such problems by giving it an opportunity to participate in a multilateral trading system, thereby giving that country an opportunity to increase its financial resources through trade. [FN335]
The WTO has shown that it is not entirely averse to implementing restrictions on member States that jeopardize the *276 health and safety of populations. [FN336] As discussed earlier, Article XX of the GATT allows member States to take steps that protect "human, animal or plant life, or health." [FN337] The caveat is that member States cannot take such action and use it as a disguise for what are regarded as protectionist actions. [FN338] In addition, the WTO created the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement (SPS) as a means for the WTO and its member States to specifically address safety concerns regarding food, animal, and plant health standards. [FN339] The SPS allows countries to set their own scientifically-based health standards which they can apply to imported goods. [FN340] The main restrictions on this seem to be that the health standards must be based on science and they must not be applied arbitrarily. [FN341]
As opposed to just saying that health standards are to be based on science and not applied arbitrarily, [FN342] the WTO must also state that international trade must be conducted in a manner consistent with the rules and agreements of international law. [FN343] The WTO only suggests that member States use international standards. [FN344] But it seems that an organization that is based on promoting universal standards for its member States is contradicting itself by saying when it comes to area "x" all member States must follow this standard, but when it comes to area "y" member States can follow any standard they want. By allowing countries to create different standards, it seems that the WTO is promulgating confusion and hardship on its member States when it comes to them trying to export their goods or services to 151 different countries who all have different standards. [FN345]
*277 The WTO's statement that "standards can become obstacles to trade" is pertinent and arguably true. [FN346] The question we must ask ourselves, however, is not whether standards are an obstacle to trade, but whether universal standards that are applied to all WTO member States create less of a barrier to trade than individually created standards that can be applied arbitrarily. [FN347] The WTO has already stated that member States may develop safety measures that provide a higher standard of care than required by international standards if the member State can show scientific reasons for implementing such higher standards. [FN348]
The WTO should codify this as part of its rules for participating in its multilateral trading regime, and the WTO should establish international standards for all WTO member States to follow. Then, States need to present arguments concerning areas that they feel are especially pertinent and require additional safety measures. The States could then vote to adopt those measures or refuse them. Either way, all member States would know what additional standards are being implemented and by whom. As additional scientific, social, and moral concerns and developments are made, they can be presented and the standards updated to reflect such changes.
By taking such steps, the WTO would be doing two things. First, it would actually be reducing obstacles to trade, which is its main objective. [FN349] Second, the WTO would be better aligning itself with international standards that many of its member States have already agreed to follow. [FN350] As opposed to a detached approach to globalization, the WTO must do a better job of taking on a more "coherence" based approach [FN351] to international *278 trade. [FN352] This would lend support not only to international organizations trying to ensure that policies at the international level are moving in the same direction, but the WTO would also solidify itself within the international community, thus not alienating itself from other international organizations.
The WTO has the capability to implement basic health-related, human rights principles that have a direct impact on the effectiveness of trade sanctions and the success of the WTO's dispute settlement system in enforcing WTO agreements. [FN353] The WTO has effective mechanisms in place to make sure WTO provisions are followed, but the dilemma is that the WTO's dispute settlement system is currently aimed toward WTO trade violations and not human rights violations. [FN354] Complicating this issue, many of the international human rights agreements are only aspirational in nature. [FN355] However, interpretation of WTO provisions should not be strictly made according to what the GATT founders may have intended. [FN356] Rather, WTO provisions should be interpreted in light of how those provisions are currently understood with respect to the major U.N. human rights conventions. [FN357] This does not mean that the WTO has to take a rights-based approach to promoting international trade. [FN358] Rather, the WTO must adopt broad interpretative mechanisms, so that WTO provisions are interpreted and understood in congruence with other international agreements. [FN359]
*279 VI. Conclusion
We shall not finally defeat AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria or any of the other infectious diseases that plague the developing world until we have also won the battle for safe drinking water, sanitation and basic health care . . . . The best cure for all these ills is economic growth and broad-based development. [FN360]
The potential effect that trade has on reducing poverty in societies is the key to addressing better health through international trade policy. Trade policy seeks to open up global economies to nations all over the world, which has the effect of improving economic conditions in some of the poorest nations. Considering that the improvement of economic conditions is the central policy of the WTO, it is no stretch to infer that poverty reduction is at the heart of the free trade philosophy. If this is in fact an accepted precept that free trade's goal is a reduction in poverty, it follows then, that improved health outcomes are a necessary side effect.
Even if improved health outcomes are not a central driving force of trade and economic policy, it should be no surprise that improved health status is also associated with favorable economic conditions. Where population-based health is good, there is also a more vigorous and productive work force. It therefore makes sound economic sense to attempt to ensure that basic health measures are provided within populations that are being utilized to increase economic output.
The solution to poverty is complex, but it involves policy development at both national and international levels. A key way of improving the economic status of societies, which will in turn positively affect the health of populations, is to provide effective mechanisms through trade policy that recognize the importance not only of expanding the global economy, but also the importance of health. Only when there is a combination of greater awareness of and action in the international community and the WTO concerning the link between poverty, health, and trade, will goals aimed at reducing poverty and improving global health actually be met.
[FN190]. WTO, supra note 142, at 49.
[FN191]. Id. at 75; Martin & Maskus, supra note 189, at 317-18, 325.
[FN192]. WTO, supra note 142, at 79.
[FN193]. Id.
[FN194]. Id.
[FN195]. Id.
[FN196]. GATT Art. XX is one of the articles that make up The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT Art. XX provides a list of general exceptions, that if satisfied, allow WTO member states to adopt trade measures that may otherwise be inconsistent with WTO trade agreements. See Paul B. Stephan, Julie A. Roin & Don Wallace Jr., International Business and Economics Law and Policy 90-91 (Lexis Nexis 2004).
[FN197]. See Zagel, Trade Sanctions, supra note 148, at 11-17.
[FN198]. See generally id. at 12.
[FN199]. See generally Yoon & McGee, supra note 178.
[FN200]. See generally Ernest Harsch, Investors Start to Eye Africa, Africa Renewal, Jan. 2005, available at http:// www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol18no4/184invest.htm.
[FN201]. Id.
[FN202]. Id.
[FN203]. Cf. Yoon & McGee, supra note 178.
[FN204]. See generally id.
[FN205]. See generally Zagel, Trade Sanctions, supra note 148.
[FN206]. See WTO, supra note 142, at 79.
[FN207]. See id. at 79.
[FN208]. Id. at 14.
[FN209]. See id. at 79.
[FN210]. Id.
[FN211]. WTO, supra note 142, at 79. The Ministerial Conference is the top decision making organ of the WTO. The Ministerial Body is made up of all WTO members, they make decisions regarding all matters that fall under the umbrella of the WTO trade agreements, and they must meet at least every two years. In 1996 the Ministerial Body met in Singapore, thus the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference. WTO, Ministerial Conferences, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_ e/minist_e/minist_e.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
[FN212]. WTO, supra note 142, at 79.
[FN213]. Id. at 9.
[FN214]. See generally id. at 9.
[FN215]. Id. at 79.
[FN216]. Id.
[FN217]. See generally WTO, supra note 142; see generally Eres, supra note 82.
[FN218]. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 708.
[FN219]. See Eres, supra note 82, at 34.
[FN220]. See generally WTO, supra note 142.
[FN221]. Eres, supra note 82, at 34.
[FN222]. See Cottier, supra note 99, at 111. "The WTO needs to be put back in its proper place and province; a better balance with human rights concern is wanted." Id.
[FN223]. See Eres, supra note 82, at 600-03.
[FN224]. See generally Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations 'Global Compact' for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration, 13 Eur. J. Int'l L. 621 (2002) [hereinafter Petersmann, Global Compact].
[FN225]. WTO, supra note 142, at 3.
[FN226]. Id.
[FN227]. See generally Amnesty International, Human Rights, Trade and Investment Matters (Amnesty International 2006), available at http:// www.amnestyusa.org/business/HRTradeInvestmentMatters.pdf.
[FN228]. See generally Vazquez, supra note 86.
[FN229]. WTO, supra note 142, at 3.
[FN230]. See Vazquez, supra note 86, at 62-63.
[FN231]. See generally Dine, supra note 46, at 125.
[FN232]. Dep't of Comm. & Pub. Info., ILO, The ILO at a Glance 3, 11 (ILO 2007) [hereinafter ILO].
[FN233]. Zagel, Trade Sanctions, supra note 148, at 2.
[FN234]. See generally Dine, supra note 46, at 125.
[FN235]. See generally Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Core International Human Rights Instruments and Their Monitoring Bodies, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
[FN236]. See generally Robert M. Stern, Labor Standards and Trade Agreements, U. Mich. Gerald R. Ford Sch. Pub. Policy, (Discussion Paper No. 496, 2003), available at http:// www.fordschool.umich.edu/rsie/workingpapers/Papers476-500/r496.pdf.
[FN237]. See ILO, supra note 232.
[FN238]. Id.
[FN239]. See Stern, supra note 236, at 9-12.
[FN240]. Cottier, supra note 99, at 114-16.
[FN241]. Stern, supra note 236, at 10-11.
[FN242]. See Petersmann, Human Rights Approach, supra note 8.
[FN243]. See Petersmann, Global Compact, supra note 224.
[FN244]. See Marjorie Florestal, Technical Assistance Post-Doha: Is There Any Hope of Integrating Developing Countries into the Global Trading System?, 24 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 121 (2007), available at http:// www.ssrn.com/abstract=945309; see generally Zagel, Trade Sanctions, supra note 148, at 21-27.
[FN245]. See Zagel, Trade Sanctions, supra note 148, at 21-23.
[FN246]. WTO, supra note 142, at 31.
[FN247]. Id. at 31.
[FN248]. Id. at 33.
[FN249]. See generally id.
[FN250]. Id. at 31.
[FN251]. WTO, supra note 142, at 31.
[FN252]. Id.
[FN253]. Id. at 31-32.
[FN254]. Zagel, Trade Sanctions, supra note 148, at 17-18.
[FN255]. WTO, supra note 142, at 48-51.
[FN256]. Id. at 48.
[FN257]. Id.
[FN258]. Id.
[FN259]. See Liz Stuart & Gonzalo Fanjul, Oxfam Int'l, Oxfam Briefing Paper: A Round for Free: How Rich Countries are Getting a Free Ride on Agricultural Subsidies at the WTO 8 (June 2005), available at http:// www.ppl.nl/bibliographies/wto/files/3750a.pdf.
[FN260]. Id.
[FN261]. Id.
[FN262]. Id.
[FN263]. See generally Petersmann, Global Compact, supra note 224.
[FN264]. See Adelle Blackett, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretation, 31 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1999).
[FN265]. Id. at 6-8.
[FN266]. Cottier, supra note 99, at 112; Zagel, WTO & Human Rights, supra note 81.
[FN267]. Petersmann, Human Rights Approach, supra note 8, at 625-27.
[FN268]. Chris Rodda, The World Trade Organization: Economics for International Students, http://www.cr1.dircon.co.uk/TB/4/WTO.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
[FN269]. Vazquez, supra note 86, at 62-63.
[FN270]. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. Id. at art. 51.
[FN271]. Id.
[FN272]. See id.
[FN273]. See id.
[FN274]. Human Rights: The Pursuit of an Ideal, http:// library.thinkquest.org/C0126065/billsanctions.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
[FN275]. See generally Vazquez, supra note 86.
[FN276]. Id. at 64.
[FN277]. Id.
[FN278]. See, e.g., Graham Bowley, U.S. Faces New Threat of EU Trade Sanctions, Int'l Herald Tribune, Feb. 14, 2006, at 1.
[FN279]. Eres, supra note 82, at 41.
[FN280]. Id. at 47.
[FN281]. Id.
[FN282]. Id.
[FN283]. Dine, supra note 46, at 197-98.
[FN284]. WTO, supra note 142, at 9.
[FN285]. Id.
[FN286]. Id.
[FN287]. Id.
[FN288]. See Petersmann, Human Rights Approach, supra note 8.
[FN289]. See Dine, supra note 46, at 197.
[FN290]. Van den Bossche, supra note 143, at 181.
[FN291]. Id. at 176-81.
[FN292]. Id. at 183.
[FN293]. Id.
[FN294]. WTO, supra note 142, at 56.
[FN295]. Van den Bossche, supra note 143, at 186.
[FN296]. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art. 4, Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_ e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf [hereinafter DSU].
[FN297]. Id. at arts. 6-20.
[FN298]. Id. at art. 25.
[FN299]. Id. at art. 5.
[FN300]. Van den Bossche, supra note 143, at 203-04.
[FN301]. Id.
[FN302]. Id.
[FN303]. Id.
[FN304]. Id.
[FN305]. Van den Bossche, supra note 143, at 173.
[FN306]. For example, Art. XX(a) of the GATT provides a public morals exception, which could be used to justify trade restrictions related to goods that are produced in violation of human rights standards. This would only require that fundamental human rights be included in the interpretation of the public morals exception of Art. XX. Zagel, Trade Sanctions, supra note 148, at 12.
[FN307]. The WTO has hinted at taking such measures. Refer to the EC-Asbestos case, where the WTO allowed for the protection of public health by affirming an import ban on products containing asbestos. Panel Report, European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000).
[FN308]. CESCR, General Comment, supra note 120.
[FN309]. See generally Petersmann, Human Rights Approach, supra note 8.
[FN310]. Id. at 612-14.
[FN311]. See generally Dine, supra note 46, at 125.
[FN312]. Cottier, supra note 99, at 131-32.
[FN313]. See Petersmann, Institutional Challenges, supra note 5, at 658.
[FN314]. See generally id.
[FN315]. HDR 2005, supra note 7, at 51.
[FN316]. Id.
[FN317]. WTO: Shrink or Sink! The Turnaround Agenda, http:// www.tradeobservatory.org/library.cfm?refID=24629 (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
[FN318]. Id.
[FN319]. See generally Petersmann, Human Rights Approach, supra note 8, at 623-27.
[FN320]. See generally Petersmann, Institutional Challenges, supra note 5.
[FN321]. See generally HDR 2005, supra note 7, at 28-33.
[FN322]. See generally Taylor, supra note 74.
[FN323]. See Smith, supra note 52.
[FN324]. See id.
[FN325]. See id.
[FN326]. See id.
[FN327]. See Anderson, supra note 3.
[FN328]. See generally Petersmann, Global Compact, supra note 224.
[FN329]. See generally Howse, supra note 78, at 655.
[FN330]. See Secretary-General, Freedom, supra note 47, at 3.
[FN331]. See generally UNHRD, supra note 49.
[FN332]. See HDR 2005, supra note 7, at 2.
[FN333]. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 712.
[FN334]. See generally Petersmann, Global Compact, supra note 224.
[FN335]. See generally Anderson, supra note 3, at 708-15.
[FN336]. See Van den Bossche, supra note 143, at 625-27.
[FN337]. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, available at http:// www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_02_e.htm.
[FN338]. Van den Bossche, supra note 143, at 597.
[FN339]. WTO & WHO, Agreements, supra note 14, at 35.
[FN340]. Id.
[FN341]. Id. at 36-37.
[FN342]. Id.
[FN343]. See Charnovitz, supra note 78, at 30. "[G]reater attention to the WTO's interface with international standards is needed." Id.
[FN344]. See WTO & WHO, Agreements, supra note 14, at 37.
[FN345]. See generally Charnovitz, supra note 78, at 11-12. "[A]n international standard can help avoid the inefficiency of segmented national markets following different standards." Id.
[FN346]. WTO, supra note 142, at 30.
[FN347]. See generally Charnovitz, supra note 78, at 11-12 (discussing the impact standard international standards can have).
[FN348]. WTO & WHO, Agreements, supra note 14, at 35.
[FN349]. Zagel, Trade Sanctions, supra note 148, at 7-8.
[FN350]. Compare WTO, Members and Observers, http:// www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2009) with Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications of the Principal Human Rights Treaties (2004), http:// www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf.
[FN351]. In this context, "coherence" means that the WTO needs to be working in conjunction with other international organizations so that they do not create competing or conflicting standards. If coherence is not achieved, the legitimacy and effectiveness of not only the WTO, but all international organizations would be undermined. The WTO needs to work with other international organizations to create a unified front where all people, States, and corporations understand the objectives that are sought. Confusion in this area would only harm and further regress those who are most in need.
[FN352]. See WTO, supra note 142, at 74.
[FN353]. Vazquez, supra note 86, at 63.
[FN354]. Eres, supra note 82, at 34.
[FN355]. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Human Rights, (2006), http:// plato.stanford.edu/entries/rights-human/; Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Sanctions Assessment Handbook, (Oct. 2004) http:// www.humanitarianinfo.org/sanctions/handbook/chapter2-3.htm.
[FN356]. Eres, supra note 82, at 36.
[FN357]. Petersmann, Human Rights Approach, supra note 8, at 606-11.
[FN358]. See generally WTO, supra note 142.
[FN359]. Victor Mosoti, Institutional Cooperation and Norm Creation in International Organizations, in Human Rights and Int'l Trade 165, 167 (Thomas Cottier, Joost Pauwelyn & Elisabeth Burgi Bonanomi eds. 2005).
[FN360]. WHO, Dying, supra note 18, at 3.
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