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Lone Parents and Social Security(2) |
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Lone Parents and Social Security(2)
C W
omen whose Husbands are Imprisoned
The remaining category of female solo parents who may be eligible for the DPB, subject to complying with subsection (1) of section 27B, consists of women who have lost the regular support of their husbands as a result of the husband's imprisonment. There is no case law under this provision as such, probably because the only discrete legal issue -- imprisonment -- is subject to data-matching between the relevant government agencies.
*23 D Men whose Dependent Children are not being Cared for by their Mother
When it was suggested to the McCarthy Commission that male solo parents should be provided with the same benefit entitlements as their female counterparts, the Commission had responded that the cases were not the same. Men were seen as more easily able to obtain a full time job and as "less trained to care for the home and children than are most women and ... less prepared to undertake those responsibilities". [FN117] The Commission had concluded, nevertheless, that men should be eligible for the same benefit as women where "the interests of all concerned [are] best met by the father staying at home and caring for the children, at least until suitable alternative arrangements can be made ...". [FN118]
As a result, a man may qualify for the DPB only on the ground that he is the father of one or more dependent children whose mother is dead or who for any other reason are not being cared for by their mother. Reflecting the views of the McCarthy Commission, these are far more restrictive criteria than those that apply to women solo parents. A man must show that the dependent child is not being cared for by her or his mother, whereas women applicants under the other gateways to entitlement need only show that they themselves are not being adequately supported by the other parent of the child. [FN119]
It is not possible for a man to argue successfully that joint custody or shared custody can lead to qualification under the rubric "any other reason". This is because sections 27BA and section 70B of the 1964 Act, taken together, ensure that only one parent can qualify for a DPB in such circumstances. [FN120] There is no definition of "cared for" in the context of the mother's relationship with the children but, in SSAA Decision No 40/92, [FN121] the Appeal Authority held that where the appellant's wife -- whilst notionally separated from the appellant -- cooked and cleaned for the appellant and their dependent children on a regular basis after working on a night shift and thus "continue[d] to be reasonably fully involved in the care of their dependent children", the appellant could not be said to be a man whose children were not being "cared for" by their mother.
*24 E The Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004
The above categories will be amended if the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004 passes into law. The introductory note to this bill outlines the governmental objective of having "neutral" laws covering what are described as "committed, exclusive and stable relationships". [FN122] It is intended that the same legal rights and responsibilities will apply to married, de facto (whether opposite or same sex), and civil union relationships, as envisaged by the accompanying Civil Union Bill 2004. The wider issues posed by these pieces of legislation are outside the scope of this article.
The intended consequential amendments to the Social Security Act 1964, however, will have a significant impact on the categories of solo parent that have just been examined. First, the 1964 Act is amended to treat persons in civil unions on the same basis as persons who are married. [FN123] Second, a definition of "de facto relationship" is inserted into the Act. This definition is intended to reflect the case law on the concept of relationships in the nature of marriage, outlined above. [FN124] In contrast to the current restriction of such relationships to those between partners of the opposite sex, however, the new concept of a "de facto relationship" will apply to relationships between a woman and a man, a woman and a woman, or a man and a man. The main consequences for the domestic purposes benefit are two-fold. First, those persons in a civil union relationship will be treated in the same way as section 27B currently treats legal marriages. [FN125] Second, persons who are in opposite-sex de facto relationships will be treated for benefit purposes in the same way as *25 married persons. [FN126] Incidental changes to the law governing what are currently relationships in the nature of marriage include a codification of some aspects of current administrative policy, under which a facilitation period may be allowed before treating a couple as having entered into a de facto relationship for benefit purposes, [FN127] and a requirement for parental consent before recognising a de facto relationship involving a person younger that 18 years. [FN128]
VIII REDUCTION OF BENEFIT
The McCarthy Commission had concluded that: [FN129]
[Although] the State's responsibility must be recognised and discharged even though the primary responsibility rests upon and is being evaded by the applicant's husband or the father of the children, the applicant for a benefit should be expected to co-operate in a reasonable action to enforce the primary responsibility.
Originally the DPB provisions required that the father or mother of each dependent child be identified in law before a grant of a DPB could be made. As we have seen, failure to do so meant that the applicant could only qualify for an emergency maintenance allowance (EMA) at a lower rate. This requirement was withdrawn, and substituted by what is now section 70A of the 1964 Act, in 1987. [FN130] As at November 2004, significant amendments to section 70A are proposed in the Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004. These will be discussed separately, following discussion of the current law.
Section 70A applies, by virtue of subsection (1), where certain benefits (including a DPB) are being paid to a solo parent and the beneficiary has failed or refused to identify in law the other parent of the relevant child, or failed to name the other parent as a liable parent or to testify in child support proceedings. Under subsection (2), the weekly rate of benefit is then reduced by *26 $22. [FN131] The policy rationale is to provide an incentive to beneficiaries who care for dependent children to ensure that the other parent complies with their child support contributions. [FN132]
There are three exceptions under section 70A(3), which apply at the discretion of the chief executive. These arise where there is insufficient evidence to establish who is in law the other parent; or the beneficiary is taking active steps to identify who is in law the other parent; or the child was conceived as the result of sexual violation or incest. [FN133] Under subsection (4), the reduction ceases to apply to a beneficiary who subsequently carries out the necessary steps under subsection (2). According to the Appeal Authority, "[this] suggests that the deduction should be lifted when or at the point in time that the Chief Executive is satisfied that the beneficiary falls within one of the exemptions provided for". [FN134] In practice, under operational guidelines, the benefit is initially granted at the maximum rate. If it becomes apparent that the other parent of the child will not be identified in law and the person receiving the benefit does not fall within one of the three exceptions outlined above, the benefit is reduced. [FN135]
A Insufficient Evidence to Establish Parental Identity
The first exception under section 70A(3), that there is insufficient evidence to establish who is, in law, the other parent, is self-explanatory. Although there appears to be no case law on the point, it would seem a logical inference that this exception will only arise in cases where the chief executive is satisfied that active steps either have been taken to identify the other parent, but inconclusively, or that such steps will not resolve the issue and cannot realistically be expected.
B Identification in Law
The second exception arises where the beneficiary is taking active steps to identify who is, in law, the other parent. The meaning of the phrase "identify in law" was considered in R v Chief Executive of the Department for Work and Income. [FN136]
*27 In that case the appellant had named the father of her daughter on an application form for the DPB in June 2000. She had not completed a child support application, because the child's birth had not been registered. The appellant had spoken to the putative father about registering the child's birth, but he had declined to sign the birth guide form. The appellant first contacted her lawyer about the issue in July and then, after a discussion with the father (who had approached her), telephoned her lawyer again in August. Eventually, in late September, a law firm was instructed to take paternity proceedings. The grant of the DPB was subject to the imposition of the $22 deduction up to the point where lawyers were first consulted about paternity proceedings.
John Hansen J rejected the appellant's submission that she had met the primary obligation to "identify in law" by naming the father in the application. [FN137] Pointing to the policy rationale, the Judge stated that: [FN138]
... [If] all that was required to 'identify' was the mere naming of a person, then the scope of the requirement in the section would be so limited that other parts of the section would be otiose.
Simply naming a person does not make them a parent 'in law'. There are various ways to establish that a person is a parent 'in law'. In this case, the most obvious ways would be a formal acknowledgement by the father, or the obtaining of a paternity order. Here it was apparent at an early stage that the father was not prepared to make a formal acknowledgement, and, in practical terms, the only other route available to the appellant was to apply for a paternity order.
Simply filling in the name [on the application form] does not satisfy the requirement of the section.
The next issue was whether, nevertheless, the appellant had satisfied the requirement of taking active steps to identify who was "in law" the other parent of her child. John Hansen J rejected an unusual suggestion by the Social Security Appeal Authority that such steps could have been taken even before the child was born. [FN139] Nevertheless, the Judge held that, on the facts, the steps taken in the case could not be described as being "active" within the meaning of the provision but rather were "desultory". John Hansen J added that the taking of active steps must be measured objectively and that "[the] lack of activity by this appellant could not be justified on any reasonable basis". By way of an obiter rule of thumb, it was suggested that, subject to evidence, a period of up to two weeks following the birth was reasonable to allow for a mother to "settle down from that trauma" and that "[following] that, advances should be made to the putative father, and if he *28 denies paternity, and will not formally acknowledge it, a solicitor should be immediately instructed."
Whilst John Hansen J found that the Appeal Authority had not itself intended to apply a blanket test requiring legal intervention in all cases, it is suggested, with respect, that both the language of the original decision, and earlier practice, indicate that this was indeed likely to have been the Authority's approach. In terms of earlier practice, in SSAA Decision No 93/92, [FN140] a reduction following failure to finalise knowledge of paternity through a lawyer was described as the "price to be paid" under section 70A for "taking things slowly". A year later, in SSAA Decision No 113/93, [FN141] the appellant provided the name of her child's father to the chief executive but the father had refused to sign a deed of acknowledgement of paternity and a child support application. The father of the child had previously accepted responsibility for the financial support of the appellant. The appellant cited cultural reasons why she could not take the matter any further. Her whanau would not allow her to communicate with the father of her child nor request written confirmation of paternity from him because there had been a serious breach of protocol -- the tribes of the appellant and the father had not met concerning the matter. The Appeal Authority held, amongst other things that "[in] order to obtain her benefit at the full rate she is required, by section 70A, to take the further steps of either obtaining a paternity order against him or of fulfilling the requirements of the Child Support Act 1991" adding that "[if] she does not wish to take these additional steps or does not feel able to do so then she is, unfortunately, not entitled to the full rate of benefit" (emphasis added). [FN142]
Underpinning the appeal in R v Chief Executive of the Department for Work and Income's case, as in many social security appeals, was the perception that the Department had fettered its discretion by a fixed policy (in this case a general policy of not accepting that "active steps were being taken until an application was made to a solicitor to take formal legal steps") [FN143] and that the Appeal Authority had effectively endorsed this approach in its decision on the facts. John Hansen J *29 simply commented that, if that was so, the policy could be challenged only by judicial review proceedings. [FN144]
Finally, it should be noted that, given the limitations set by section 49 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980, there are obvious difficulties in identifying the parent of a child over the age of six "in law". [FN145] These are outside the scope of this discussion.
C Sexual Violation or Incest
The remaining exception is that arising from sexual violation or incest. An immediate problem is then the well-recognised reluctance of survivors to disclose the event except under closely controlled conditions. [FN146] Where such an allegation is made, MSD staff are instructed neither to require proof by way of police reports nor to require "unnecessary detail". [FN147] In SSAA Decision No 039/03, the Appeal Authority held that: [FN148]
Where the Chief Executive is satisfied that a beneficiary falls within the [sexual violation] exception and there has been a delay in the disclosure of the information which has led to the exception being established in our view the Chief Executive should consider under the provisions of section 81 [which gives the chief executive the power to review the rate of any benefit previously paid to a beneficiary] whether or not the beneficiary should have been paid a benefit at the full rate without deduction from the time of application or whether deduction should be lifted only from the time the Chief Executive is satisfied that one of the exemptions applies. Such a consideration would involve taking into account a number of different factors including the reasons why the appellant did not disclose the nature of the child's conception at an earlier stage, and the length of the delay in making the disclosure.
*30 Assuming that section 81 of the 1964 Act can be used in this way, [FN149] the approach of the Authority in applying that analysis to the facts gives little scope for believing that many applicants will benefit from it. In the case in question, the appellant had been raped and had not realised that she was pregnant until it was too late for an abortion. The father (who was imprisoned for armed robbery at the time of the child's birth) had a history of violence and had subsequently harassed the appellant and her children, leading to protection orders and a number of stays in a women's refuge. She had been too fearful to take steps to identify him as the father "in law" and had not disclosed the sexual violation. Eventually, almost ten years after the deductions commenced, a lawyer wrote to the Department noting that there would be difficulty in instituting paternity proceedings and the deduction was eventually removed from the date of that letter. The Appeal Authority dismissed an appeal against the earlier deductions and ruled out the use of section 81 in this case. The Authority's reasoning was that the appellant was aware of the relevant law, the delay was "unusually lengthy" and the appellant had had the opportunity to disclose the sexual violation to the Department on a number of occasions. It is suggested that this approach manifestly overlooks the nuances of disclosure in such cases, particularly in its reference to an implied anomaly arising from disclosure to the appellant's lawyer yet continuing non-disclosure to the Department.
D Risk of Violence not Currently a Ground for Exemption
There is currently no exemption under section 70A on the ground that identifying the other parent will lead to a risk of violence to the mother or to her child or children. This issue arises repeatedly in practice and initially clouded the application in SSAA Decision No 039/03, [FN150] since the applicant's case for not identifying the father "in law" had originally been presented to the Department as arising from fear of the consequences for her and her family. Under existing operational guidelines, [FN151] beneficiaries who have genuine concerns about violence from the other parent if a child is included in their benefit are simply to be advised that information contained in their benefit record is confidential and that -- while failure to apply for child support will result in a reduction in their benefit rate -- they can still include the child in their benefit. Concerns about the welfare of the child are to be referred to the Department of Child, Youth and Family Services. At the very least, the continuing application of the reduction to women who fail to identify fathers on this basis has been difficult to reconcile with the recognition -- in other policy areas -- of the *31 impact of violence on the relevant statutory criteria. [FN152] As we will see below, that legislative gap is about to be remedied by provisions in the Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004.
E Availability of Ameliorative Entitlements
The extent to which the reduction under section 70A can then be compensated by other forms of social security support remains open to argument. Under section 61G of the 1964 Act, a "supplementary" special benefit is available to "top up" core social security benefits, at the chief executive's discretion, on grounds of a continuing deficiency between income and essential expenditure. In SSAA Decision No 89/95, [FN153] the Appeal Authority ameliorated the effect of section 70A by allowing the mother of children, whose father had not been identified for fear of violent retribution, to qualify for a special benefit to meet some of the resulting shortfall when a reduction had been imposed. The Department had relied on instructions in the relevant internal policy manual by using the full notional rate of the DPB as the "core benefit" figure when assessing the income deficiency for special benefit purposes, notwithstanding that the appellant's benefit was in fact reduced by $44 a week ($22 a week each for two dependent children). On applying the "theoretical" full notional rate of benefit, rather than the actual amount received, she had then been found not to qualify for the special benefit. By the time of the hearing, the appellant had three dependent children whose father had not been named and $88 per week was being deducted. [FN154] Whilst the Department argued that Parliament could not have intended the reductions under section 70A to be "nullified" by the provisions of section 61G, and the Appeal Authority agreed that the incentive in section 70A should not be "lost". The Authority held that it was "not reasonable to expect a person with three children to care for and support to survive on $88 or even $66 less per week than another in a similar position". [FN155] This was said to be particularly so where *32 the appellant had been threatened with violence and had suffered extreme financial hardship (in this case for over a year) so that "these threats [were] sufficiently real to her that they [provided] a more powerful incentive than the financial incentive in section 70A to name the other parent". Although the Authority suggested obiter that a deduction might properly have been made for one child, and special benefit still calculated at the full rate, in SSAA Decision No 031/02, [FN156] an appellant, who had been paid the DPB with a reduction for one child whose father was not named, was noted as having then received the special benefit because of the resulting shortfall in her budget. [FN157]
Whilst the result in these decisions may appear to be inconsistent with the approach under which emergency benefit is almost certainly unavailable for those unmarried women beneath the age of 16, to prevent circumvention of the minimum age limit, [FN158] the issues may be distinguished on the basis of the underlying purpose of each benefit. In addition, the Appeal Authority's approach is consistent with the statutory scheme under which, historically, express provision has been made in cases where Parliament intended to exclude access to supplementary benefits by way of reinforcing other sanctions. [FN159]
Since the special benefit may be limited in time, [FN160] it was suggested by the Appeal Authority, in an earlier decision involving the effect of violence on eligibility per se, that supplementary assistance might be utilised for a time-limited period to enable some resolution to be reached on the failure to name, through specialist intervention. [FN161] A tidier solution, of course, and one that was repeatedly raised in this context, was to amend the legislation to provide a further exception to the duty to identify the father. Successive governments declined to adopt this option, [FN162] until the introduction of the Social Security (Social Assistance) Bill 2004, to which we may briefly turn.
*33 F The Social Security (Social Assistance) Bill 2004
The failure of some sole parent beneficiaries to legally identify the other parent of their child, or their refusal to apply for child support, has been a regular feature of political controversy and one that enjoys seemingly undiminished media appeal. [FN163] As the Explanatory note to the bill puts it: [FN164]
A growing number of liable parents are failing to meet their financial responsibilities to their children. This in turn creates a financial inequity between the parents in respect of the costs of supporting their children, reduces the child support revenue the State receives to help offset the costs of paying sole parent benefits, makes it financially harder for the custodial parent to move off benefit as that parent would not receive child support, and may cause financial disadvantage to their children.
As a response, the Government proposes to increase the current $22 reduction in benefit for continuing failure to meet the requirements of section 70A, [FN165] once the beneficiary has been given what the bill describes as "a reasonable opportunity to reconsider their decision". [FN166] It is proposed that an additional reduction of $6 per week per child will be applied on or after 1 July 2005, where three months have passed since the $22 reduction was imposed and the failure continues. It will continue to apply until the beneficiary has met the requirements of section 70A for all dependent children. [FN167] The "opportunity to reconsider" is envisaged as taking the form of information through correspondence and an early intervention programme involving a home visit by MSD field officers. [FN168]
These new penalties, when aligned with other Government measures such as the well-publicised "Jobs Jolt" package, [FN169] have been seen as resulting from a desire to reduce electoral traction for right of centre opposition parties when seeking support from those who view *34 beneficiaries in a negative light. [FN170] They are balanced, however, by the introduction of two further exemptions from liability for the reduction. First, a benefit will not be reduced if the chief executive is satisfied that the beneficiary or any of the beneficiary's children would be at risk of violence if she or he complied with any of the relevant requirements. [FN171] "Violence" carries the same meaning in this context as in section 3 of the Domestic Violence Act 1995, namely physical abuse, sexual abuse and psychological abuse (including intimidation, harassment, damage to property, and threats of such abuse). [FN172] It is not clear who is intended to make this risk assessment, which will often call for some specialised knowledge well beyond that likely to be held by the MSD's case managers. [FN173] Second, no reduction will apply if there are compelling circumstances and there is no real likelihood of child support being collected from the other parent (or their estate) for the foreseeable future. [FN174] This is designed as a default option, where it is clear that a sole parent beneficiary's circumstances are such that no reduction should be imposed, notwithstanding that they do not fall within the existing exemptions: [FN175]
Compelling circumstances under which the new exemption could apply include-
? refugees and asylum seekers where the other parent(s) of the child is overseas, missing, or deceased:
? where the other parent of the child is deceased:
? carers of children not their own where the natural mother has not established paternity.
*35 IX EFFECT OF CUSTODY
Since 1991, in most circumstances, only one parent can qualify for the DPB. The rationale is that parents are expected to arrange custody so that one of them can obtain paid work. [FN176] Custody arrangements between parents are generally divided into either "split" or "shared" custody. [FN177]
Split custody arises where parents are living apart and each parent has care of at least one child of the relationship. [FN178] Under section 27BA(1) of the 1964 Act, where parents of two or more dependent children are living apart and each parent is the principal caregiver of one or more of the children, only one parent is entitled to a DPB in respect of the children. This is so even if both parents would otherwise be entitled, notionally, to the benefit.
Subsection (2) of section 27BA then sets out a priority order which is used in determining which parent is entitled to the DPB. First, if one parent already receives a DPB in respect of any of the children, it will continue to be paid. The other parent will not be eligible. Next, if both parents apply at the same time, the parent whom the chief executive considers was the principal caregiver immediately before the separation will be entitled to the DPB. "Principal caregiver" is defined as the person who in the opinion of the chief executive had primary responsibility for day to day care of the child, other than on a temporary basis. [FN179] For this purpose, for example, a custodial parent whose child is away on holiday with the non-custodial parent has been held to retain primary responsibility for the child during the holiday period. [FN180] Finally, if neither parent was the principal caregiver before they began living apart, or the chief executive is unable to ascertain which parent fulfilled this role, then the parent who has custody of the youngest child is entitled to the DPB. As *36 the Appeal Authority once put it, "[the] provisions of section 27BA(1) and (2) are clearly designed to encourage separated parents to organise their families in such a way that only one parent can be paid [a DPB]". [FN181]
The only exception, arising under subs (3) of section 27BA, is where each of the parents "has become" the principal caregiver in respect of at least one child pursuant to "split" custody under a court order. In this case both parents may receive a DPB. This recognises the reality of split custody as an effective form of day-to-day "sole" custody of a child. [FN182] Such an order is rare, however, and the exception does not apply to the far more common custody agreements which have been registered in the Court. When an appellant and his wife had an informal agreement as to split custody, but then obtained court custody orders in order to attempt to assist in qualifying for a DPB, the Appeal Authority held that subsection (3) was directed rather to the situation where: [FN183]
[The] parents have been unable to agree on custody arrangements in relation to their children and after a defended hearing a family court has ruled that custody of the children should be split between the parties and as a result each parent becomes the principal caregiver in respect of at least one child ... The words of the section require each parent to become the principle caregiver as a result of the court order being made. In our view any other interpretation would negate the intention in section 27BA ss (1) and (2) that generally speaking only one Domestic Purposes Benefit should be paid other than in what is the relatively unusual circumstances of a court determining that the custody of the children should be split.
In the absence of such a court order, in split custody cases the other parent may apply for another social security benefit and have their child(ren) included in that other benefit, but they must meet all the criteria for payment of that benefit (for example, the "work test" in the case of an unemployment benefit). In addition, the other benefit will be paid at a less generous rate than the DPB. [FN184]
Shared custody arises where the parents take the child(ren) "turn and turn about". In the words of section 70B of the 1964 Act, the parents of a dependent child are living apart, they are both beneficiaries and each has the "primary responsibility for the care of that child" for at least 40 per cent of the time. [FN185] Under section 70B(1), only one parent is eligible to have that child taken into *37 account for assessing entitlement to any benefit and for fixing the rate of that benefit. This is the parent whom the chief executive determines has the greater responsibility for care of the child(ren). [FN186] In deciding who has the greater responsibility, under subsection (2) the chief executive has to have regard primarily to the periods the child is in the care of each parent and then to the following factors:
(a) How the responsibility for decisions about the daily activities of the child is shared;
(b) Who is responsible for taking the child to and from school and supervising the child's leisure activities;
(c) How decisions about the education or health care of the child are made;
(d) The financial arrangements for the child's material support;
(e) Which parent pays for which expenses of the child.
In considering "the periods the child is in the care of each parent" under subsection (2), the Appeal Authority has adopted conflicting approaches. In SSAA Decision No 167/01, [FN187] the Authority held that the phrase must relate to the term "primary responsibility for the care of that child" under subsection (1). In that case, one parent had primary responsibility for the child during periods when he was in school, during which time she was the principal contact person and decision-maker on educational matters. On this basis, the Authority attached no significance to the fact that the child was actually at school for part of the time during which the parent was primarily responsible for care. Against this, in a later decision, the Authority focused on the time actually spent with each parent as opposed to the time period for which each parent was notionally responsible for the child. In SSAA Decision No 009/03, [FN188] the respective hours of notional responsibility favoured the mother, but the weekday period during which she was responsible for care included a significant element of school time. The father (who cared for the children from Thursday morning until Sunday evening) was held to have had greater responsibility "in terms of direct contact" and to then qualify for the DPB. It is suggested that the former approach is to be preferred, since the legislation refers to responsibility for "care", and reading this to mean "direct contact" arguably places a gloss on the plain statutory wording.
If the chief executive is unable to ascertain that one parent has the greater responsibility using these criteria, then only the parent whom the chief executive ascertains to have been the principal *38 caregiver immediately before the parents began living apart is entitled to have the child taken into account in assessing entitlement to a benefit and the rate of benefit payable. [FN189] The only questions relate to the respective roles the parties had while they were living together -- who had the greater responsibility or was principal caregiver? [FN190] If, in turn, this cannot be ascertained, the parents must agree between themselves as to which of them may have the child taken into account. By way of a blunt incentive to reach agreement, until that agreement is reached neither can qualify as having the child taken into account. [FN191] Nevertheless, the Appeal Authority has suggested that, in shared custody situations, applications should be handled in a manner which does not exacerbate tensions between the parties and that it might be appropriate "that a person who is not the case manager of either applicant, interviews each person independently and reaches a conclusion as to who is the person with primary responsibility for the children concerned". [FN192]
Where one parent is granted a DPB as the result of a decision under section 70B, the other parent may qualify for another benefit but only at the single rate and the child will not be included in the rate of that other benefit. [FN193] The operational instructions then probably operate as a fetter on the discretion to grant an emergency benefit under section 61 in stating that emergency benefit cannot be paid at all to the other parent on the basis of part-time care for the qualifying child. [FN194] The Appeal Authority has suggested, however, that "given the clear indication in section 70B that the children should be included only in the benefit of one parent in shared custody situations" it would not consider it appropriate to include children -- even in an assessment of an emergency benefit granted to the other partner and based on hardship -- in the absence of "special or unusual circumstances". [FN195]
*39 Rigidly applied so as to extend to "safety net" provisions -- and the case law suggests that it is often so applied -- this analysis might obviously affect contact which the children have with separated parents who are both beneficiaries. [FN196] For example, in SSAA Decision No 106/92, [FN197] the appellant, whose partner qualified under section 70B, could not afford to feed the children whilst they were with him. Nevertheless, in subsequent decisions, the Authority has expressed "some sympathy for the proposition that assistance needs to be given to beneficiaries to meet the basic costs relating to access", [FN198] including entitlement to a "supplementary" special benefit under section 61G of the 1964 Act, on grounds of hardship. [FN199] In SSAA Decision No 045/03, [FN200] the Appeal Authority rejected a submission from the chief executive that section 70B precludes the chief executive from taking access costs into account in assessing entitlement to a special benefit.
X WORK TEST
The work-testing approach introduced in 1997, and outlined above, was abandoned following a critical analysis of its operation. [FN201] Under that analysis, work-testing was seen to embody several key weaknesses. [FN202] The most significant aspect of the change was described as being a shift from a *40 status-based approach, tied to the age of the youngest child, to a needs-based approach, tied to "assistance tailored to individual strengths and needs as well as taking into account family responsibilities". [FN203]
In essence, the work-test obligations for recipients of the DPB were replaced with an enhanced case management model, aimed at promoting "goal setting and planning" linked to preparation for employment "when circumstances make this appropriate". [FN204] In place of the work-test, under section 27(2A) of the 1964 Act, a person receiving a DPB as a solo parent must comply with a range of obligations with the stated objects of facilitating the movement of beneficiaries into continuing employment "as their parenting responsibilities and individual circumstances allow", providing opportunities to improve capability for employment and improving social and economic outcomes for those beneficiaries and their dependent children. [FN205] Under the new provisions, recipients of a DPB are required to attend interviews so as to participate in a planning process designed to support the move from benefit to work. The process is essentially designed to identify constraints on obtaining and sustaining employment arising from the person's individual circumstances or parenting responsibilities. [FN206] A failure without good and sufficient reason to cooperate in the prompt development of what is then termed a "personal development and employment plan", or a failure to demonstrate commitment to the plan on an annual review, may lead to reduction of the benefit as a sanction. [FN207] A benefit that has been reduced by a sanction may then be increased to the full rate and backdated to the date the reduction took place, as soon as the beneficiary concerned agrees to comply with the relevant requirement. [FN208]
Many submissions on the Bill opposed the generally compulsory requirements and associated sanctions, particularly because the criteria for the imposition of sanctions are vaguely defined. [FN209] *41 In response, the majority of the Select Committee argued simply that "an Act which contains requirements must also contain consequences for when requirements are not met". [FN210] The new provisions, which were coupled with a change to the abatement regime allowing solo parents to retain more earned income, have attracted no case law.
XI CONCLUSION
The potential for the administration of the DPB to intersect with broader issues of family policy is reflected in a number of respects. The reduction in the rate of the benefit for failure to identify the father of the child, which is not applied in some overseas jurisdictions, [FN211] has been described by one commentator as having "more in common with the New Poor Law in nineteenth century Britain than any of the benefits introduced by the 1938 Social Security Act". [FN212] The past failure to make any exception where the non-identification arises from fear of violent retribution has clear implications, in terms of family policy, for both mother and child(ren). The proposed closure of this legislative gap is long overdue. [FN213] The need to consider the role of social security support within a violent relationship is further highlighted by the general absence of consideration of "notional entitlement" in the relevant case law, despite operational guidelines providing for the possibility of entitlement. [FN214]
Other issues where family policy intersects with the operation of the DPB include the factors which are used to establish an initial inference of a relationship in the nature of marriage, or whether married people are "living apart", which include the sharing of childcare responsibilities. [FN215] The inevitable tensions created in those cases where a contest arises between the parents for eligibility for the benefit, either before, during, or after a custody dispute, serve as another example. [FN216] Furthermore, a number of Appeal Authority decisions over the past decade, [FN217] *42 indicate that the MSD and its predecessors have regularly ignored the Authority's view that -- where appropriate -- the special benefit should be calculated so as to facilitate access to children by non-custodial parents. [FN218] In these instances, even if the current legislative structure is accepted, it would seem desirable to ensure that the Ministry's operational guidelines are consistent with such broader social policy goals and formulated with appropriate consideration of wider family policy issues.
Structurally, [FN219] of course, the domestic purposes benefit for solo parents is very much a child of its time. The need which prompted the introduction of the statutory benefit remains, however, and -- in the eyes of some -- in exacerbated form. As we have seen, in 1972 the McCarthy Commission had found that solo parents faced a high risk of poverty. A report in 2003 estimated that more than 60 per cent of children in households with one income live below the poverty threshold and that lone parents are particularly affected. [FN220] Criticisms of the benefit, of course, range from libertarian objectors who oppose any provision of social security to solo parents, [FN221] to those who accept that the benefit is necessary but see an enhanced role for attaching conditions to eligibility (and particularly conditions as to work-testing). [FN222]
The unique characteristic of the DPB for solo parents is then that restrictive changes -- whether on access to the benefit or reduction in its rate -- have the potential to adversely affect the children *43 whose dependency gives rise to entitlement in the first place. [FN223] As the current Minister of Social Services and Employment once stated, it should not be overlooked that income support in the form of the DPB "contributes towards the needs of children and towards the valuable task of childcare", and that "[where] children are involved, there is the extra concern of their well-being and healthy development. They deserve special consideration because of their vulnerability." [FN224]
XII POSTSCRIPT
Since this article was accepted for publication, two significant developments have occurred. First, the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill has been reported from the Justice and Electoral Select Committee, and subsequently enacted. [FN225] The majority recommendation was that the proposed amendments to the Social Security Act 1964 relating to de facto couples, and outlined above, should be omitted. [FN226] The reasoning underlying this recommendation was the difficulty of dealing with substantive policy, and especially the effect of Ruka v Department of Social Welfare, [FN227] in an amending bill of this particular type. The government was left to address this issue during the two-year lead-in period to the extension of coverage to same-sex de facto couples, possibly through the developments of terms of reference for referral to the Law Commission. [FN228]
Second, and more fundamentally, in February 2005 the government announced that it planned to introduce a single "core" social security benefit in 2007-2008. [FN229] It is intended that this single benefit will replace the domestic purposes benefit, along with other current core benefits. [FN230] The Minister for Social Development and Employment is due to report back to Cabinet on this issue by the end of 2005 with detailed proposals for legislation to be introduced in 2006. [FN231]
[FN117]. Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social Security in New Zealand, above n 7, 249.
[FN118]. Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social Security in New Zealand, above n 7, 249.
[FN119]. SSAA Decision No 33/94 (17 May 1994) SSA 167/93 which concerned an arrangement where the woman was the primary caregiver was held to rule out DPB for the man. In SSAA Decision No 036/04 (undated) SSA 061/03, the Appeal Authority emphasised that for a child to be a dependent child, she or he must not only be financially maintained by the parent, but the parent must be the child's primary caregiver. Whilst the appellant was closely involved in childcare on a regular basis, the Appeal Authority emphasised the interim custody order obtained by his wife.
[FN120]. See Part IX EFFECT OF CUSTODY.
[FN121]. SSAA Decision No 40/92 (14 May 1992) SSA 7/92.
[FN122]. Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004, no 151-1 explanatory note, 1.
[FN123]. Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004, no 151-1 sch 8.
[FN124]. Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004, no 151-1 explanatory note, 8. As currently drafted in Schedule 9 of the Bill this goal seems not to be met when considering whether two people "live together as a couple", see proposed section 3B(1), defining a "de facto relationship". For example, under the new test, the couple must be willing to support one another financially (and any child of the relationship) if the need exists and simply be "committed to each other emotionally", see proposed section 3B(3). The Ruka test, outlined above, requires, at least, evidence of continuing emotional commitment in addition to financial interdependence, see Part VII A Unmarried Women. Further, in determining whether two people are living together as a couple, the new test then resorts to the check-list approach found wanting in Ruka (proposed section 3B(4)) and leaves the decision-maker free to attach any weight to any item on the checklist that seems appropriate (proposed section 3B(5)).
[FN125]. So that the dissolution of a civil union has the same effect on benefit entitlement as the dissolution of a marriage, see proposed paragraph (c) to s 27B(1) in Schedule 9. The new drafting retains the current -- but now modified - distinction between a "single woman" who is the mother of one or more children, under proposed paragraph (a) to subsection (1) and a "woman whose marriage or civil union has been dissolved", under proposed paragraph (b) to subsection (1). A woman "whose de facto relationship has ended" is then added to the latter category in paragraph (b). The current application of this distinction is criticised above, in the commentary to note 113 and following.
[FN126]. This change is intended to take effect as from 1 April 2007, Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004, no 151-1, sch 9.
[FN127]. Proposed s 3C in the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004, no 151-1, sch 9.
[FN128]. Or alternatively, on application, consent by the Family Court, see proposed section 3B(2) in the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004, sch 9. Any rules made under section 16A of the Family Courts Act 1980 will apply to such applications, under proposed section 3B(2) in the Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004, no 151-1, sch 9.
[FN129]. Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social Security in New Zealand, above n 7, 259. This general issue of primary responsibility was dealt with at chapter 35 of the McCarthy Report.
[FN130]. Social Security Amendment Act 1987.
[FN131]. The amount equivalent to the maximum amount of family support payable for a second or subsequent child.
[FN132]. Hon Ann Hercus, Minister of Social Welfare (18 March 1987) 479 NZPD 7849. For the child support scheme, see n 116.
[FN133]. In relation to the third exception, the current operational guidelines instruct staff that proof is not required, police reports are not essential, and that - if the client makes such an allegation - "unnecessary detail" is not to be required, see note 38.
[FN134]. SSAA Decision No 039/03 (4 April 2003) SSA 056/02.
[FN135]. The taking of "active steps" is subject to an administrative four week "period of grace" under the guidelines, see n 38.
[FN136]. R v Chief Executive of the Department for Work and Income [2003] 3 NZLR 319 (HC).
[FN137]. An analysis later applied in SSAA Decision 039/03, above n 134.
[FN138]. R v Chief Executive of the Department of Work and Income, above n 136, para 16-18 John Hansen J.
[FN139]. Noting that "(it) would not infrequently be the case that a father, being confronted with a child on birth, may change a previously held attitude", R v Chief Executive of the Department for Work and Income, above n 136, para 27 John Hansen J.
[FN140]. SSAA Decision No 93/92 (31 August 1992) SSA 40/92.
[FN141]. SSAA Decision No 113/93 (3 November 1993) SSA 103/93.
[FN142]. On the cultural issue, the Authority held that "[s 70A] may well result in a process that could be regarded as culturally insensitive, but the appropriate forum for that submission is Parliament, so that the appropriate legislative changes can be made. Neither the Department nor this Authority is in a position to assess the cultural sensitivity of particular provisions of the Social Security Act: the Department's role is to ensure that it makes its decisions in accordance with the provisions of the Act and this Authority's role is similar ....."
[FN143]. Under the operational policy (as to which see note 38) it seems implicit that any recognised consultation with a lawyer must be with a view to the taking of such formal steps to establish paternity.
[FN144]. There are a number of historical examples of challenges on this basis. See for example, Ankers v Attorney-General [1995] 2 NZLR 595 (HC). It remains a complex and arguably unsatisfactory remedy in the usually pressing circumstances of most social security cases.
[FN145]. One answer, although a highly technical one, is an application for a declaration of paternity under section 10 of the Status of Children Act 1969. See generally Webb and others, above n 116, para 6.513; Trapski and others, above 116, (vol 5) "Paternity".
[FN146]. The literature on reluctance to report and/or disclose is extensive. For a New Zealand survey, see Jan Jordan "Women, Rape and the Reporting Process", in Juliet Broadmore, Coral Shaw and Tania Warburton (eds) Rape: Ten Years On: Proceedings of an Inter-Disciplinary Conference (Doctors for Sexual Abuse Care, Wellington, 1996).
[FN147]. For the relevant operational guideline relating to this exception, see also n 133, para 30.
[FN148]. SSAA Decision No 039/03, above n 134.
[FN149]. Such an approach would seem not to offend the High Court's analysis that section 81 of the Social Security Act 1964 cannot be employed retrospectively so as to substitute one benefit for another, see Moody v Chief Executive, Department of Work and Income, above n 110, applied in Chief Executive, Department of Work and Income v Vicary [2001] NZAR 628 (HC), since the issue is the rate of a benefit already granted. See generally "Social Security Law", above n 36; Black, Harrop and Hughes, above n 11; and The Laws of New Zealand Social Security, above n 36.
[FN150]. SSAA Decision No 039/03, above n 134.
[FN151]. See n 38.
[FN152]. The Court of Appeal accepted in Ruka v Department of Social Welfare, above n 63, that violence towards the woman may be one indicator that no relationship in the nature of marriage exists. Further, under existing policy, the usual two week stand down before entitlement to a benefit (including a DPB) commences, see section 80 of the Social Security Act 1969, is not applied where the woman concerned has entered a women's refuge. Special needs grants under section 124 of the Social Security Act can be paid to solo parents without resources who are escaping violence and who are being assisted in relocation. See the operational guidelines, above n 38, under "Special Needs Grants".
[FN153]. SSAA Decision No 89/95 (8 August 1995) SSA 55/95.
[FN154]. It was unclear from the evidence before the Appeal Authority whether this also included deduction for debts owing to the Department as well.
[FN155]. The MSD's operational policy, above n 38, does not address this issue directly, but states under "Special Benefit" that one consideration in deciding whether to grant a special benefit is the "extent to which the basic necessities of life for the client and any dependant would be at risk if the Special Benefit was not granted or [the benefit] was paid at another rate". In this context, this guideline might be taken to outweigh other guidelines which state that consideration could be given to declining (or reducing) the special benefit where the client has refused to access alternative sources of assistance (in this case, by identifying the father "in law").
[FN156]. SSAA Decision No 031/02 (23 April 2002) SSA 172/01.
[FN157]. Although the rate and mode of calculation remained unspecified.
[FN158]. See n 38.
[FN159]. Such as "work test failure" or loss of employment due to misconduct, both of which excluded access to the special benefit (amongst other things) under now-repealed provisions.
[FN160]. Office of the Minister of Social Services Work and Income, Ministerial Direction "Special Benefit" (10 February 1999) as amended paras 5.1 and 5.2, see Social Security Act 1964, s 5. See Also Stemson v Director-General of Social Welfare (28 June 2000) HC AK AP23-SW00; Nicholl v Chief Executive, Department of Work and Income (6 March 2001) HC WN AP 20/99.
[FN161]. SSAA Decision No 120/93 (15 December 1993) SSA 28/93, a pre-Ruka, decision relating to the effect of violence on eligibility under section 63(b) of the Social Security Act 1964.
[FN162]. In 2002, for example, a number of submissions on the Social Security (Working Towards Employment) Amendment Bill 2001, no 178-1, raised the issue, without response from the select committee, in the context of changes to the DPB under that Bill.
[FN163]. The number has increased from 7,965, or 5.6% of all sole parents in 1993 to 19,467, or 16%, in 2004: Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004, no 193-1, Explanatory note, 2.
[FN164]. Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004, no 193-1, Explanatory Note, 2.
[FN165]. Now redefined in a new proposed paragraph (c) to section 70A(1) of the Social Security Act 1964: Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004, no 193-1, cl 7.
[FN166]. Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004, no 193-1, cl 3.
[FN167]. Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004, cl 7, which repeals the current subsection (4) of section 70A of the Social Security Act 1964 and substituting new subsections (4)-(8).
[FN168]. Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004, no 193-1, Explanatory note, 3. When the Bill was reported back, the Social Services Committee recommended that clause 7 should come into effect on the day after the Bill received the Royal assent, so as to give beneficiaries "reasonable time to reconsider" before July 2005, but otherwise recommended no change to the provision. Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004, no 193- 2 (the commentary) 2-3.
[FN169]. See John Hughes "Jolt and Jive" [2003] ELB 73.
[FN170]. For differing responses to the Bill, albeit advancing this same analysis, see the first reading speeches of Sue Bradford, for the Green Party, and Katherine Rich, for the National Party, at (15 October 2004) 620 NZPD 15809 and 15805 respectively.
[FN171]. Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004, no 193-1, cl 7 proposing to insert a new para (ba) to section 70A(3) of the Social Security Act 1964.
[FN172]. Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004, no 193-1, cl 7, proposing to insert a new subsection (9) in section 70A of the Social Security Act 1964.
[FN173]. Presumably for this reason, as noted at note 133 above, case managers are advised not to insist on "unnecessary details" when dealing with the incest or sexual violation exemption. Two analogies exist under the of the Social Security Act 1964. First, there is the mandatory involvement of a professional agency where an unmarried mother aged 16 or 17 applies for an emergency maintenance allowance under section 61 on the ground that it is unreasonable for her to live with her parents, amongst other things because of the risk of violence (see note 41, above). Second, assessment of whether there has been a family breakdown under section 60F, for purposes of entitlement to an independent youth benefit for a 16 or 17 year old, is an issue that again often involves family violence. The MSD relies on a preliminary assessment by psychologists employed by the Specialist Education Services (SES). This interviewing is then contracted out under a Memorandum of Understanding between the MSD and the SES.
[FN174]. Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004, no 193-1, proposing to insert a new para (bb) into subsection (3) of section 70A of the Social Security Act 1964.
[FN175]. Social Security (Social Assistance) Amendment Bill 2004, no 193-1, explanatory note, 4.
[FN176]. For custody, see Webb and others, above n 116, paras 6.101 -- 6.142 and the research cited there; Trapski and others, above n 116, (vol 4) "Custody".
[FN177]. See for custody, see Webb and others, above n 116, paras 6.101 -- 6.142 and the research cited there; Trapski and others, above n 116, (vol 4) "Custody". See also Georgie Hall and Angela Lee Family Court Custody and Access (Department of Justice, Wellington, 1994); Stuart Birks (ed) Childrens' Rights and Families: Proceedings of a Social Policy Forum (Centre for Public Policy Evaluation, Massey University, Palmerston North, 2001); Anne B Smith and others Children Whose Parents Live Apart: Family and Legal Concepts (Children's Issues Centre, University of Otago, Dunedin, 2001). Possible reforms are outlined in Ministry of Justice Responsibilities for Children (Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 2000).
[FN178]. Meaning a child born or adopted into the union: Social Security Act 1964, s 27BA(5). Split custody has a particular place within Maori cultural practice following separation between parents. See Hall and Lee, above n 175, 74.
[FN179]. Social Security Act 1964, s 3. The definition excludes any incorporated or unincorporated body or the proprietors of various institutions in which a child might be cared for.
[FN180]. SSAA Decision No 044/02, above n 56. The Authority noted that the custodial parent will "inevitably have ongoing costs relating to the maintenance of the child such as accommodation costs and must continue to plan a budget for other ongoing child related expenses regardless of whether the child is in the custodial parent's actual physical care".
[FN181]. SSAA Decision No 023/03 (17 March 2003) SSA 236/02.
[FN182]. See Hall and Lee, above n 177, 75.
[FN183]. SSAA Decision No 023/03, above n 179 (emphasis added).
[FN184]. See Ministerial Task Force on Income Maintenance, above n 74.
[FN185]. Under section 12 of the Child Support Act 1991, resolution under section 70B of the Social Security Act 1964 then operates as a guideline for purposes of the 1991 Act. The correlation between the two provisions for child support purposes is outside the scope of this article. See Webb and others, above n 116, para S.208; Trapski and others, above n 116, (vol 5) "Child Support".
[FN186]. Before October 1991, under Departmental guidelines, both parents could receive a DPB if they shared custody of a child for an average of three nights per week each, although the Social Security Appeal Authority had questioned whether this approach was consistent with the legislation: SSAA Decision No 14/92 (19 January 1992) SSA 61/90.
[FN187]. SSAA Decision No 167/01 (14 November 2001) SSA 147/01.
[FN188]. SSAA Decision No 009/03 (14 February 2003) SSA 078/02.
[FN189]. Section 70B(3) of the Social Security Act 1964. This does not extend to any question of apportionment where a child disability allowance under section 39E of the Social Security Act 1964 is involved, even though that allowance also uses the term "principal caregiver": SSAA Decision No 055/03 (17 April 2003) SSA 65/02.
[FN190]. SSAA Decision 106/92 (23 September 1992) SSA 65/92; SSAA Decision No 44/95 (19 June 1995) SSA 65/94. For an example of the application of this provision where differences between existing responsibilities were "marginal", see SSAA Decision No 167/01, above n 187. In the context of a volatile relationship, marked by frequent separations, the fact that the appellant did not care for the children during periods of separation (other than for holidays or access weekends) was held to point to his partner having primary care during the period in question; SSAA Decision No 074/2004 (23 June 2004) SSA 219/03.
[FN191]. In SSAA Decision No 33/94, above n 119, a benefits review committee was held not to have followed section 70B when it referred the matter back to the parties without determining who had been the principal caregiver when they began to live apart.
[FN192]. SSAA Decision No 009/03, above n 188. For an illustration of such tensions being generated by the provision see for example SSAA Decision No 13/02, (15 March 2002) SSA 171/01.
[FN193]. SSAA Decision No 44/95 (19 June 1994) SSA 65/94.
[FN194]. For the guidelines, see n 38.
[FN195]. SSAA Decision No 009/03, above n 188.
[FN196]. For the family policy implications of such restricted contact, see Hall and Lee, above n 177; Birks, above n 177; Smith and others, above 177.
[FN197]. SSAA Decision 106/92, above n 190.
[FN198]. SSAA Decision No 68/02 (13 June 2002) SSA 003/02. In this case, however, the Authority declined to award such assistance on the basis that the appellant had not taken "responsible steps to ensure that he can balance his budget".
[FN199]. SSAA Decision No 106/99 (19 October 1999) SSA 110/99; SSAA Decision No 040/02 (29 April 2002) SSA 135/01; SSAA Decision No 070/03 (29 May 2003) SSA 127/02; SSAA Decision No 087/03 (26 June 2003) SSA 251/02; SSAA Decision No 045/03 (15 April 2003) SSA 097/02. The measure adopted by the Appeal Authority in assessing food costs for purposes of the special benefit is the Estimated Food Costs Survey 2002 conducted by the Department of Human Nutrition, University of Otago, which applies a graduated scale depending on the age of the child, see SSAA Decision No 040/02 (29 April 2002) SSA 135/01; SSAA No 050/02 (21 May 2002) SSA 004/02. The standard costs formula provided in the Ministerial Directive on special benefit, above n 158, makes no allowance between differing costs in feeding and clothing children at different ages, or in different areas of the country. Limited provision for differences in the number and age of children is made through family support payments.
[FN200]. SSAA Decision No 045/03, above n 199.
[FN201]. Ministry of Social Development "Evaluating the February 1999 Domestic Purposes Benefit and Widows Benefit Reforms" in Documents on DPB/WB Reform (Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, 2001).
[FN202]. For example, a failure to take into account broader issues than the age of dependent children that might be acting as a barrier to participation in training employment; not fully taking into account family responsibilities or individual circumstances; and not sufficiently supporting those who were not yet work-tested to progress towards work if they chose to do so, see Office of the Minister of Social Services and Employment "Paper to the Cabinet Social Equity Committee: Social Assistance Initiatives: Paper C" (7 November 2002) SEQ(01)124, para 6. See also The New Zealand Government Pathways to Opportunity (The New Zealand Government, Wellington, 2001).
[FN203]. Office of the Minister of Social Services and Employment, above n 202, para 7. One aspect of such assistance is the training incentive allowance programme under section 124(1)(d) of the Social Security Act 1964, directed to those receiving a DPB, or related emergency benefit, an invalid's benefit or a widow's benefit. For consideration of the scope of this programme, see SSAA Decision No 144/02 (20 November 2002) SSA 105/02; SSAA Decision No 148/02 (20 November 2002) SSA 113/02.
[FN204]. Social Security (Working towards Employment) Amendment Bill 2002, no 178-2, as reported from the Social Services Committee (the commentary) 1.
[FN205]. Social Security Act 1964, s 60P.
[FN206]. Social Security Act 1964, s 60Q.
[FN207]. Social Security Act 1964, ss 60W and 60X.
[FN208]. Social Security Act 1964, s 60Y.
[FN209]. Social Security (Working Towards Employment) Amendment Bill 2002, no 178-2, as reported from the Social Services Committee (the commentary) 4. The main criterion under section 60U of the Social Security Act is failure, without "good and sufficient reason", to "demonstrate commitment" to planning requirements, with only two such reasons (failure of the MSD to provide assistance or to take action) being stated expressly. Against this, the National Party and ACT Party minority views to the select committee's commentary opposed the repeal of work-testing (at pp 11-12).
[FN210]. Social Security (Working Towards Employment) Amendment Bill 2002, no 178-2, as reported from the Social Services Committee (the commentary).
[FN211]. These are Scandinavian and Germanic countries, with New Zealand and the United States of America alike applying reductions for failure to identify. See Robert Stephens "The Level of Financial Assistance to Families with Dependent Children: A Comparative Analysis" (2003) 20 Social Policy Journal of NZ 173, 187.
[FN212]. Goodger, above n 1, 135.
[FN213]. See n 160.
[FN214]. See n 110.
[FN215]. See n 102.
[FN216]. See n 190.
[FN217]. See n 197.
[FN218]. The potential impact of the intended abolition of this benefit and its replacement with a less flexible measure of temporary additional support has yet to be fully gauged, see n 40.
[FN219]. In terms of the categories of those eligible.
[FN220]. Child Poverty Action Group Our Children: The Priority for Policy (Child Poverty Action Group, Auckland, 2003). See also Charles Waldegrave, Robert Stephens and Peter King "Assessing the Progress on Poverty Reduction" (2003) 20 Social Policy Journal of NZ 197. For specific research in relation to the DPB, amongst other things, see Deborah Ball and Moira Wilson "The Prevalence and Persistence of Low Income Among New Zealand Children" (2002) 18 Social Policy Journal of NZ 92. For varying approaches to this threshold, see Robert Stephens, Charles Waldegrave and Paul Frater "Measuring Poverty in New Zealand" (1995) 5 Social Policy Journal of NZ 88: Brian Easton "Measuring Poverty: Some Problems" (1997) 9 Social Policy Journal of NZ 171, and the response from Stephens, Waldegrave and Frater at (1997) 9 Social Policy Journal of NZ 181. For an assessment of relative poverty based on participation criteria, see Ministry of Social Development The Social Report 2004 (Ministry of Social Development, Wellington, 2004) 60-73.
[FN221]. Most prominently, perhaps, the visiting US welfare analyst Charles Murray, who famously argued as a guest of the NZ Business Roundtable that it was time to "get tough on young women and their babies" (2 June 2001) Weekend Herald Auckland, by "cutting off all [state] assistance to some segment of the population -- let's say girls under 21" as a way of influencing the behaviour of young people in the future: (27 June 2001) The Dominion Wellington.
[FN222]. See the dissenting report to the Select Committee's Commentary on the Social Security (Working Towards Employment) Amendment Bill 2002, no 178-2.
[FN223]. Even when the DPB is granted, the unmet needs of both parent and child may have such effects. See Maureen Baker and David Tippen "More Than Just Another Obstacle: Health, Domestic Purposes Beneficiaries, and the Transition to Paid Work" (2004) 21 Social Policy Journal of NZ 98 and Tim O'Donovan and Karen McMillan "An Employment Barrier: The Health Status of DPB Recipients' Children" (2004) 22 Social Policy Journal of NZ 97.
[FN224]. Hon Steve Maharey "Why We Need the DPB" (5 July 2001) The Dominion, Wellington, responding to Charles Murray, above n 219.
[FN225]. Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004, no 151-2.
[FN226]. Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004, no 151-2 (the commentary) 5.
[FN227]. Ruka v Department of Social Welfare, above n 63.
[FN228]. Relationships (Statutory References) Bill 2004, no 151-2 (the commentary) 7.
[FN229]. Ministry of Social Development "Working Towards a Single Core Benefit" (22 February 2005) Press Release.
[FN230]. Office of the Minister for Social Development "Memorandum to Cabinet Policy Committee: Extending Opportunities to Work" (2 February 2005).
[FN231]. Office of the Minister for Social Development, above n 230.
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